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The Problem of the Missing Witness:
Toward an Educator-Facilitator
Role for Labor Arbitrators*
Howard R. Sackst
Lewis S. Kurlantzicktt
A problem often encountered in labor arbitration is what, if anything,
the arbitrator should do if the parties involvedfail to produce a key wit-
ness. The authors examine in detail the many interests, goals and argu-
ments that should be considered when an arbitrator is faced with the
problem of the missing witness. They conclude that the arbitrator should
avoid both passivity and aggressive activism and assume instead an "edu-
cator-facilitator" role.
I
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, contract disputes between labor unions and
employers, unless settled through negotiation, are normally resolved
through binding grievance arbitration.' A difficult problem often en-
countered in labor arbitration is what, if anything, the arbitrator should
do if the parties fail to produce a witness whose testimony is essential to
a proper disposition of the case.
Consider, for example, the following case. 2 A policemen's union
contests in arbitration a city's discharge of two policemen for allegedly
assaulting an arrestee held in the city's police station. Neither em-
* Many people contributed to this article; we want particularly to thank United States
District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein and Professors Eileen Silverstein, James H. Stark, Wendy
W. Susco, and Michele Taruffo.
t LL.B., Yale Law School. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
Alternate Public Member, Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration. Member, AAA
Labor Panel.
t1 LL.B., Harvard University. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
Professor Kurlantzick has taught several courses dealing with the limits of adjudicative processes
as mechanisms for dispute settlement and the ordering of social relationships.
1. To be distinguished is "interest arbitration," which involves settlement of disputes as to
the terms of a new labor contract. This article discusses only grievance arbitration.
2. This case and other cases used in this article, while unreported, are drawn from Professor
Sacks' experience as a labor arbitrator.
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ployer nor union calls the alleged victim as a witness, even though his
testimony is obviously crucial.3 Should the arbitrator play a passive
role, deciding the case on the basis of the evidence the parties choose to
present to him? Or should he be more active? If so, within what limits
and in what fashion should he conduct his search for the missing piece?
Should he limit himself to a polite inquiry about the missing witness?
If the answer given seems sensible (e.g., the witness recently died), the
arbitrator might easily let the matter rest. But suppose the answer does
not seem plausible. Suppose the witness had told the party's advocate
that he was "too busy" to appear, but the advocate made no effort to
subpoena him. Should the arbitrator pursue the matter further by of-
fering to subpoena the witness? As a last resort, should the arbitrator
ever call the witness as his own?
The proper role for the labor arbitrator in the missing witness situ-
ation is part of a much larger problem: the role of the decision-maker
in adjudicative proceedings. The missing witness problem confronts
not only arbitrators, but judges, hearing officers, administrative law
judges and members of administrative agencies. Moreover, the deci-
sion-maker, whether arbitrator or other, must decide how active to be
in seeking additional documentary evidence, in questioning witnesses,
in engaging in legal research beyond that done by the parties, in devel-
oping theories in addition to those put forth by the parties,4 and in
insuring that all interests are represented in the proceeding, even
though this may require that additional parties be brought in. Indeed,
the problem of activity versus passivity on the part of the decision-mak-
ers involves the larger question of whether adjudication ought to be
based on an adversarial or an interrogative (inquisitorial) model.'
This article addresses the problem of the arbitrator and the miss-
ing witness. After rejecting three potential "easy" solutions to the
3. In the actual case, used as an example in the pages that follow, the arbitrator stated his
belief that the missing testimony of the arrestee was critical. When it became clear that neither
would call the witness, the arbitrator indicated that the parties' behavior was disturbing. The
union gave no reasons for its action, but the arbitrator surmised that the reason was that the
testimony would have supported the city's case. The city explained that it did not want to call the
witness because the arrestee was suing the city and the police officers for deprivation of his civil
rights. The city believed that calling the arrestee as a witness in the arbitration would have jeop-
ardized its defense in the civil suits.
The arbitrator then stated that he would call the witness himself. The union lawyer's reaction
was almost violent; he characterized the arbitrator's decision as "officious meddling." The arbitra-
tor reconsidered and decided not to call the witness. The city, after changing its counsel in the
case, decided not to summon the witness after all. The arbitrator decided not to uphold the police
officers' discharge, and modified their penalty to a lengthy suspension without back pay.
4. We plan to address the issue of the arbitrator's role, if any, in developing additional
theories, in a later article.
5. For general discussion of these two models, see G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW 120-23 (1978); Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30 (H.
Berman ed. 1961).
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problem and discussing the arguments for arbitral passivity, we pro-
pose that the arbitrator take a modestly active stance, and play an "ed-
ucator-facilitator" role. That is, we believe an arbitrator confronted
with a missing witness should educate the parties as to the importance
of the missing testimony and suggest methods through which a party
may overcome its reluctance to call the witness. The remainder of the
article is devoted to examining the many factors an arbitrator must
consider when deciding how to deal with a missing witness problem.
Although limited to the narrow question of the missing witness, we
hope our identification and analysis of these factors will shed some
light on the broader question of the optimal active/passive combina-
tion in the adjudicative role.
II
Is THERE A SIMPLE SOLUTION TO THE MISSING WITNESS
PROBLEM? THREE POSSIBILITIES EXAMINED
In wrestling with the problem of what the arbitrator should do
when he faces a missing witness problem, we have identified three pos-
sibilities for a quick solution which would obviate the need for any
elaborate analysis of the issue.
A. One solution would be to forget theproblem since an arbitra-
tor can err only once. If such an arbitral response to the missing wit-
ness problem displeases either party, that party will simply refrain from
using the particular arbitrator again. The keystone of this quick solu-
tion is that, to survive in the profession, arbitrators must remain accept-
able to unions and employers. Arbitrators thus have a strong incentive
to conform their conduct to party expectations.
There are several difficulties, however, with this solution, which is
based on arbitrators' contingent tenure. For one thing, not all arbitra-
tion is done on an ad hoc basis. Under some collective bargaining
agreements, a particular arbitrator--or panel of arbitrators-is selected
to arbitrate all disputes throughout the life of the contract. In these
situations, companies or unions could lose confidence in arbitration if
the permanent umpire (or panelist) was more active or more passive
than the party wanted.
Even in ad hoc arbitration, the arbitrator might do damage in one
case, frustrating party intentions and expectations and damaging not
only his own reputation but that of arbitration generally. Moreover,
since arbitration has no formal feedback process, it might be months or
years before either the arbitrator or the parties using him discover the
mismatch between the arbitrator's conception of the arbitral role and
the parties' conception of that role.
At a deeper level though, party satisfaction with its "private judge"
19821
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is not necessarily the ultimate test of the proper limits of the arbitral
role. Dean Harry Shulman, an eminent arbitrator, and Professor Lon
Fuller, a distinguished student of adjudication, offer important al-
though conflicting insights into this issue. Dean Shulman argues that
one of the advantages of voluntary arbitration is party control of the
process through the incident risk of dismissal imposed on the arbitra-
tor. He goes so far as to urge, for example, that concerns normally
harbored about exparle communications with and by judges are not
equally applicable to arbitrators, given the parties' control over the se-
lection process.6
But this argument is unpersuasive. In rejecting Shulman's confi-
dence in party control, Professor Fuller offers two important thoughts.7
First, he notes that whatever arrangements develop in a particular situ-
ation are not necessarily approved by the people affected. For exam-
ple, it is unrealistic to say that workers in a factory have approved a
particular conception of the arbitrator's role. (In fact, only a few chief
figures, and principally the arbitrator himself, have any sense of the
possible alternatives.) Second, if "party consent" means merely the ap-
proval of those small numbers of officials directly concerned with the
arbitration, it alone cannot justify the arbitrator's conduct. Consider,
for example, the threat to the integrity of arbitration posed by arbitra-
tor indifference to an award "rigged" by the officials involved.'
Indeed, the reputation, and hence utility, of arbitration as a dis-
pute-resolving mechanism is threatened if it is perceived as lacking in
integrity. In addition, reliance on "acceptability" as the major control
over arbitrator conduct may make matters too easy for the arbitrator;
he may be able to ignore or insufficiently consider the ethical or profes-
sional-responsibility issues raised by his behavior.9
Private selection of the arbitrator, then, should not excuse the arbi-
trator from responsibility to the arbitral process. Thus, we cannot sim-
ply ignore the missing witness problem on the theory that party control
of arbitrator selection insures satisfactory results.'"
6. Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1023
(1955).
7. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3.
8. Id. A "rigged award" is a case in which the parties do not really dispute the validity
under the contract of employer action but rather go through the motions of an adjudication simply
to persuade the grievant and others that justice is being done. For additional discussion of the
"rigged case," see E. TEPLE & R. MOBERLY, ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 87 (1979).
9. An example would be whether he should accede to the request of only one of the parties
to mediate the dispute. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LA-
BOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES § II-F (National Academy of Arbitrators 1974).
10. We do not suggest that party selection of arbitrators is without advantage. For a good
defense of party selection, as compared with government selection (labor courts), see Getman,
Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 926-31 (1979).
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B. Accordingly, we turn to a second potential easy solution to the
problem: follow the law. Unfortunately, the law on this subject fails to
provide an adequate guide for arbitrators when confronted with a miss-
ing witness situation. Arbitration statutes offer little guidance. The
typical statute, such as Connecticut's, does not speak to the issue at all.
The only remotely relevant section provides that one ground for vacat-
ing an award is "if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct...
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy
or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced."" This provision does not guide the arbitrator about what
to do when she believes crucial evidence is missing, unless we are to
assume that the legislature intended by its silence that the arbitrator
should do nothing.
Definition of proper arbitral behavior, though, is not completely
derived from the vacation provisions. These provisions give us only the
outside limits placed on arbitrator behavior. The vacation statutes do
not mean that as long as the arbitrator has not violated the norms ex-
pressed in the legislation he has acted properly. 2 Here, as in many
areas, the lack of available appeal does not indicate that the correct
decision has been made or that the decision has been made through the
correct procedures.' 3 Moreover, the fact that arbitration agencies, such
as the Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, find it
necessary to issue rules on grievance arbitration indicates that the legis-
lature merely established a broad framework for arbitration-a set of
minimum standards-leaving to others the task of working out details.
While we have found no judicial decisions dealing with arbitrator
action or inaction in a missing witness situation,' 4 arbitration rules do
offer some guidance. Rule 28 of the Voluntary Labor Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) provides:
The parties may offer such evidence as they desire and shallproduce
such additional evidence as the Arbitrator may deem necessary to an un-
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-418(c) (1980). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West
1972).
12. Imagine the following case: A collective bargaining agreement between a faculty union
and a community college administration provides that if a new faculty member is appointed, any
existing faculty member with "substantially equivalent" credentials will have his salary raised to
the same level as the new member. A new teacher is appointed, and an existing member com-
plains that he is entitled to have his pay raised to the level of the newcomer. At a hearing both
parties focus their arguments on the issue of equivalence. Subsequently, when the arbitrator
hands down his decision, he rules against the grievant on the ground of laches. We would con-
demn this behavior as improper both in terms of the lack of responsiveness to the parties' claims
and the failure to give them a chance to meet the laches argument.
13. Similarly, for example, in baseball one can argue that an umpire's call was erroneous
even if that decision is final.
14. We searched Lexis and the West Decennial Digests from 1936 to October 1980, but found
nothing.
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derstanding and determination of the dispute. When the Arbitrator is
authorized by law to subpoena witnesses and documents, he may do so
upon his own initiative or upon the request of any party. ... "
The first sentence clearly authorizes the arbitrator to direct the parties
to produce a witness. That power can be made effective against a recal-
citrant party, since arbitrators usually have subpoena powers and,
under the terms of the second sentence, an arbitrator could subpoena a
witness "upon his own initiative." This rule is important because many
grievance arbitrations are conducted under AAA auspices, and because
the AAA rules have served as a model for other arbitration agencies,
such as the Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration
(CSBMA). Thus, section 31-91-37 of the CSBMA Rules of Procedure
provides that "[tihe parties may offer such evidence as they desire and
shall produce such additional evidence as the panel members may
deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute,"
and section 31-91-34 permits arbitration panels of the Board to exercise
the Board's subpoena power.' 6
Rules of this sort authorize the arbitrator to call a witness on his
own. Moreover, by inference, they suggest the power to do something
less, such as raise the issue with the parties and explore the adequacy of
their reasons for declining to produce a witness whom the arbitrator
deems crucial. These rules, however, are open-ended. Neither requires
that the arbitrator follow a particular course of action. Rather, they
simply confer authority, which an arbitrator may or may not use.
Thus, they offer no solution as to how the arbitrator should decide
when to use such authority.
C. A third possible solution would be: do as the trial judge does.
That is, since the judicial process has been perfected over a number of
centuries, judges presumably have found solutions easily adaptable to
arbitration. 7
There are, however, two critical problems with this potential
source of guidance. First, judges rarely express their views in opinions
15. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION RULES
(1979) (emphasis added).
16. In pertinent part, section 31-91-34 reads as follows: "The subpoena power of the Board
may be used at the discretion of the panel only when it becomes evident that the panel will be
unable to render a fair and just decision without the appearance of a material witness or pertinent
records or documents." The two cited rules are found in CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 39-91-37, 39-
91-34 (1981).
17. Professor Fuller, in analyzing the forms and limits of adjudication as a method of social
ordering, and trying to define in some general sense what it means to act like a judge, includes as
"adjudicators" not only those who are called judges, but also decision-makers such as hearing
officers, commissioners, and arbitrators. L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 705
(1949).
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or elsewhere about the missing witness problem.' 8 When they do, they
apparently disagree. Our impression from speaking with a few federal
trial judges and reading published opinions19 is that-with the excep-
tion of expert witnesses 2° -there is neither uniform judicial practice
nor any consensus in principle about whether and when a judge should
call a witness.2'
Consider, for example, the well-known Supreme Court case of
Johnson v. United States,22 involving a personal injury suit brought
under the Jones Act. There, a fellow employee of the plaintiff seaman
had witnessed the accident and was available to testify about the cause
of plaintiffs injury, but was not called by either party. The majority
did not find the absence of the witness crucial. In a dissenting opinion,
however, Justice Frankfurter argued:
A trial is not a game of blind man's bluff; and the trial judge-particu-
larly in a case where he himself is the trier of the facts upon which he is
to pronounce the law-need not blindfold himself by failing to call an
available vital witness simply because the parties, for reasons of trial
tactics, choose to withhold his testimony.
Federal judges are not referees at prize-fights but functionaries of
justice.23
Justice Frankfurter thought the case should be remanded so the trial
judge could call the bystander witness. He was alone in his dissent,
however, and his position occasioned some scholarly criticism.24
In a recent article U.S. District Court Judge William W.
Schwarzer urged trial judges to play a very active role in assuring the
constitutionally-guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel in
criminal cases including, for example, continual monitoring of per-
18. Judges apparently have the legal authority to call a witness. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 614,
706.
19. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948); United States v. General Motors
Corp., 561 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978).
20. See infra note 98.
21. Trial judges, the cases reveal, have wide discretion in handling this question. Our
search, however, disclosed no established, unambiguous set of criteria to be employed in the exer-
cise of that discretionary authority. See, e.g., Longview Refining Co. v. Shore Co., 554 F.2d 1006
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977); Schneider v. Yakima County, 65 Wash. 2d 352, 397 P.2d 411 (1965);
9 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2484 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
In some cases the missing witness problem is resolved before the case gets to trial. Thus, a
United States magistrate, or a judge conducting a pre-trial conference, may alert the parties to the
problem, and as a result effect a resolution at this earlier stage of the process. Thus, any full-scale
study of the practice of judges would have to take into account the entire process and not just the
ideas or practices of trial judges.
22. 333 U.S. 46 (1948).
23. Id. at 54 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
24. See Note, Trial Judge's Duty to Call Witnesses in Res Ipsa Loquitor Cases, 58 YALE L.J.
183 (1948).
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formance of counsel.25 Schwarzer also discussed civil litigation, and
implied that it would be proper for a trial judge to protect a party by
calling a witness if the advocate failed or refused to call the witness for
insufficient reason.26 We suspect, though, that many judges would re-
ject the activist role recommended by Judge Schwarzer. From our
brief survey, we conclude that no consensus exists among judges as to
what judges do, or ought to do, when they believe a crucial witness has
not been called to testify.
27
A second problem with the judicial model is the difference be-
tween judicial and arbitral processes, particularly with respect to the
missing witness issue. In other words, if there were a consistent judicial
practice, is there good reason for the arbitrator not to follow it? While
for our purposes we need not resolve this question, we submit there are
some significant differences between the two processes. For example, if
a judge calls a witness in a jury trial, the jury may give undue weight to
that witness' testimony.28  In arbitration, there is no such problem, al-
though there might be if an arbitrator were inclined to give undue
weight to the testimony of a witness he insisted on calling.29 Judge and
arbitrator also differ in their source of authority.3" The judge derives
his commission from the state and has broad power to do justice-
within the limits imposed by constitution, statute, precedent, and self-
restraint. In dealing with contracts, for instance, the judge need not
enforce provisions which are deemed unduly harsh.3 If a judge, in the
25. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV.
633 (1980).
26. Id. at 665-69.
27. It is worth noting that there may be a trend in Western Europe to expand judicial power
to include the right to call witnesses. One of the authors, at a conference in Israel, discussed with a
number of European participants the practice in Western Europe of calling witnesses in civil
cases. In some countries, such as Austria and Germany, the judge has had this power for many
years. In other countries, such as France and Italy, recent changes in codes have given judges the
power. Whetherjudges, especially older ones who have grown up on a system tuned to a passive
role, will use this power remains to be seen. The change, it was said, evinces a greater concern for
achieving justice, and a downgrading of the classic liberal view that free individuals be permitted
to pursue their own interests, with the state acting only as referee.
28. United States v. General Motors Corp., 561 F.2d 923, 934 n.52 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (judge
may "tilt or oversteer jury or control their deliberations.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 87-98.
30. In response to the question of how adjudication is affected by the source of the arbiter's
power, Professor Fuller sets forth, in summary manner, the possible advantages of (1) adjudica-
tion supported by governmental authority, as in the case of a judge, and (2) adjudication which
derives its power from a contract of the parties, as in most forms of arbitration. He observes that
one special quality of contractually authorized arbitration--that the contract to arbitrate may con-
tain explicit or implicit limits on the adjudicative process itself---cannot be called unequivocally
an "advantage" or a "disadvantage." Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353, 392-93 (1978).
3 1. Fuller, supra note 7, at 7-9.
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interest of justice, can refuse to enforce a contract, surely he can call a
witness despite what the parties say.
In contrast, the arbitrator draws his authority from the collective
bargaining agreement. He has no power to disregard the contract.32
Unlike the judge, he cannot argue that since he has the power to void a
contract provision he can surely void a party agreement not to call a
particular witness.
Moreover, because his selection is subject to the parties' discretion
the arbitrator often feels he should behave in a way which conforms to
party expectations. Hence, the arbitrator may quite understandably
hesitate to call a witness over party objections. In contrast, judges usu-
ally have long terms, or even lifetime appointments. This substantial
difference in tenure may well indicate that judges are entitled to exer-
cise power more freely than arbitrators.
The admonition to "do as the judges do" founders for the forego-
ing reasons. Most importantly, judges furnish no consistent practice to
emulate. But even if they did, differences between the judicial and ar-
bitral roles might still make its application to our problem
questionable.
Since there are no quick solutions to the missing witness problem,
we must engage in a more detailed analysis.
III
THE GOALS OF ADJUDICATION
Before developing the respective cases for arbitrator passivity and
arbitrator activism in the missing witness situation, it will be helpful to
set forth the goals of adjudication in the labor-relations context. A pri-
mary goal is truth-finding; that is, the arbitrator must find the actual
facts so that he may then apply the provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement to them.33 Equally important and obviously intercon-
nected is doing justice, which may be defined as correctly interpreting
the agreement and correctly applying its provisions to the employer-
union dispute. A third goal is promoting reasonable eiciency in the
32. Of course, if the parties give him the authority to pass upon legal questions outside the
contract, e.g., whether a provision in the contract is void under a statute, and the arbitrator is
willing to exercise that power, he becomes more like a judge. Whether and when the arbitrator
should pass upon questions of "external law" is a subject of much debate among arbitrators. For
an introduction to the literature, see E. TEPLE & R. MOBERLY, ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 382-95 (1978).
33. We are aware of the view that adjudication is not really a serious search for truth, but
finds its justification on other grounds, such as the moral education of the community. We doubt
that many parties to a grievance arbitration would accept this view; nor do we believe that the
search for truth in labor arbitration is so hopeless that we should abandon the quest. Our impres-
sion is that arbitrators usually come pretty close to finding the facts correctly, and to the extent
that they fail, attention to such factors as the missing witness problem would improve the results.
19821
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expenditure of money and time resolving the dispute. We would ordi-
narily not want to spend $500 on an arbitration to resolve a dispute
over whether a police officer or the employing city should pay for a
damaged flashlight worth only $10.11 We also want arbitration to be
expeditious in producing a final decision in the dispute.
A fourth arbitration goal ispromoting the acceptability of the deci-
sion. In particular, the decision should be acceptable to the loser (even
though it will often disagree with the result) so that it complies
promptly with the decision, and does not challenge the award in court,
or before some other forum, such as a labor relations agency. But the
decision should also be acceptable to the wider community, such as the
other employees in the shop and the general public, so that the reputa-
tion of arbitration as an effective and just dispute-settling mechanism is
preserved. The goal of acceptability is obviously dependent on
whether the decision-making process-including the degree of activism
displayed by the arbitrator-is, and is perceived to be, fair.
Still other more subtle goals may be affected by the way in which
we resolve the active/passive problem. Respecting the dignity and the
autonomy of theparties is such a goal. A procedure which interferes
with a party's control of the presentation of its case infringes on auton-
omy, and may decrease acceptability of the decision. A related goal is
supporting 'ndustrial self-government," that is, the process by which
unions and employers govern their own relationships by rules and pro-
cedures of their own choosing.35 Arbitration is an integral part of that
arrangement, and it must function effectively if the grievance proce-
dure is to work well.3 6
These goals of adjudication in the labor-relations context are di-
rectly affected by the choice made in resolving the missing witness
problem. They are, therefore, crucial to the following analysis of the
problem.37
34. Sometimes, however, parties will bring such disputes to arbitration, even though it might
seem to be a waste of scarce societal resources. For instance, the union might bring a "loser" to
arbitration either to assure the grievant the satisfaction that an impartial tribunal adjudicated his
grievance, or to send some message to the employer.
35. "The collective agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into being
a new common law--the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant. . . . A
collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government."
United Steelworkers v. Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579-80 (1960).
36. Disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements usually go through several steps
of the "grievance machinery," such as a conference between the local union and the plant man-
ager, before coming to arbitration. Only a tiny percentage of disputes eventually get to arbitra-
tion; perhaps 95% or more are settled in one of the earlier "grievance steps." For discussion of the
interdependent relationship between arbitration and other parts of industrial self-government, see
Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 1, 43-45.
37. Arbitration provides a private resolution of the labor-management dispute, free from
media coverage or public attendance. Arbitration may also provide catharsis for the grievant who
Vol. 5:87
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IV
A PASSIVE ROLE FOR THE ARBITRATOR?
Arbitrator passivity in the missing witness situation may promote
the goals of labor arbitration. Arbitration, like other forms of adjudi-
cation in the United States, uses an adversary system for finding truth
and doing justice. Under such a system, the parties may not expect or
want the decision-maker to do anything but listen and decide. Inter-
vention by the decision-maker may be resented and resisted, and may
be perceived by one side as being partial to the other.
Because grievance arbitration, unlike the judicial or administrative
process, is purely consensual, party expectations have special force.
The parties themselves-without legal compulsion and as a part of "in-
dustrial self-government"---choose arbitration as their dispute-resolv-
ing mechanism. Moreover, the parties play a large role in selecting the
particular arbitrator and can often both veto the choice of one person
and rank the acceptability of others. Thus it would not be unreasona-
ble for the parties to argue that because they shaped the arbitral process
and selected the arbitrator, the decision-maker should follow their
wishes and not his own vision of his office.
If the parties reason this way, arbitrator intervention, even if lim-
ited merely to a question of why the witness has not been called, could
damage acceptability of his award, harm the reputation of grievance
arbitration generally, diminish party dignity and autonomy, and have
ripple effects on other elements of industrial self-government, such as
reducing the effectiveness of the grievance machinery. The risks to the
goals of labor arbitration are especially great if the arbitrator not only
raises the missing witness problem but proceeds to explore with the
parties the reasons for their refusal to call. The danger is greatest if the
arbitrator refuses to accept those reasons and decides to call the witness
as her own. The dangers of arbitrator intervention are illustrated by
the police discharge case described at the beginning of this article38
where the union's lawyer reacted almost violently, characterizing the
arbitrator's conduct as "officious meddling."
A related argument may be derived from "free market" principles.
If one party can afford a more resourceful advocate than the other
party, so be it. There is no reason for the arbitrator to attempt to right
the balance between good and bad advocates. If a party's advocate
does not see the importance of calling a witness, it is not the arbitrator's
role to rescue him from his folly.
wants a chance to tell his story in full, even if he eventually loses. Whether the arbitrator is active
or passive as to a missing witness would not seem to affect achievement of these goals.
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Still another argument for the passive approach is that the arbitra-
tor may not have the last word-justice may yet be done. To be sure,
chances are remote that a court will vacate an arbitration award be-
cause a party (or the arbitrator) failed to call a witness. The party that
failed to call the witness is unlikely to embarrass itself by asking a court
to rescue it from its own failing, and the grievant will usually not have
"standing" to challenge the award, since he is not a party to the arbitra-
tion or the underlying contract. 39 On the other hand, if a union's repre-
sentation of an employee in an arbitration is shockingly inadequate, the
employee might have a claim against the union (and the employer) for
breach of the union's duty of "fair representation. '
V
THE CASE FOR LIMITED ARBITRATOR ACTIVISM:
THE ARBITRATOR AS EDUCATOR AND
FACILITATOR
Despite the arguments supporting a passive role for the arbitrator
confronted with a missing witness situation, we are persuaded that a
better case can be made for at least a limited form of arbitrator activ-
ism. We believe an arbitrator should intervene in order to educate the
parties about the existence and nature of the problem,4 and, if neces-
39. With the exception of some early cases, e.g., Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264,
99 N.W.2d 132 (1959) and Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82 N.W.2d 172 (1957),
American courts have generally refused to grant standing to individual union members in griev-
ance arbitration when the union is the contractually established exclusive grievance representa-
tive. See Parker v. Borrock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 156 N.E.2d 297 (1959); O'Brien v.
Curran, 106 N.H. 252, 209 A.2d 723 (1965). Contra Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191
(D. Conn. 1974).
Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., has never been overruled by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and
is occasionally cited with approval by other courts, e.g., National Elevator Industries, Inc. v. Local
5, Elevator Constructors, 426 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1977). However, the early concept of an
employee right of intervention (standing) has been replaced by the more limited fair representa-
tion action against the union. Bellanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 1332, 346 A.2d 124 (1975), cer.
denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
40. This important principle, derived from the union's statutory role as exclusive representa-
tive of all employees in the bargaining unit, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), requires the union to give
fair and at least minimally competent treatment to a grievant, both in deciding whether to carry
the case to arbitration, and then in conducting the arbitration proceeding itself. See, e.g., Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S; 171 (1967).
There is considerable literature on the "fair representation" doctrine. See, e.g., Rabin, The
Impact of the Duty of Fair Representation Upon Labor Arbitration, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 852
(1978). It appears, however, that unions are not liable for mere mistakes (ordinary negligence) in
representing a grievant. See Morgan, Fair i Foul and Foul is Fair-Ruzicka and the Duty afFair
Representation in the Circuit Courts, II TOLEDO L. REv. 335 (1980).
41. For example, consider our police discharge case. See supra text accompanying note 3.
When the arbitrator indicated that he thought the testimony crucial and the parties' failure to call
the witness disturbing, the arbitrator was "educating" the parties as to the perceived defect in the
record. The arbitrator, unfortunately, inquired no further, but leaped ahead to suggest that he
would call the witness, thus provoking an angry response from the union. Had he pursued the
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sary, to help them solve it.4 2 In short, the arbitrator should play an
educational and facilitating role.a3
We divide our arguments for the educator-facilitator role into two
sets. The first is addressed to the parties themselves. The argument in
brief is that it is in the parties' se/f-interest to have grievance arbitrators
assume some responsibility for developing a complete record by play-
ing an educational and facilitating role. The second set of arguments
involves thepublic interest in truth-seeking and justice in arbitration,
goals which will sometimes require arbitrators to go beyond a passive
stance.
A. Party Se/f-Interest
The parties in any form of adjudication have a strong interest in
knowing how they fare with the decision-maker. The decision-maker,
in turn, should have a responsibility to inform them of his doubts and
concerns. As Professor Fuller has expressed it,
I should like ... to record my discontent with the implications some-
times drawn from the adversary system in my own country. One of
these lies in the notion that a judge should throughout the trial remain
passive; somewhat like a well-behaved child, he speaks only when spo-
ken to. His role is thought of as being that of an umpire who is stirred
to action only when he must resolve a dispute that arises between the
contending lawyers. The notion is, I believe, based on a profound mis-
take. The essence of the adversary system is that each side is accorded
participation in the decision that is reached, a participation that takes
the form of presenting proofs and arguments. . . . [W]hen the party is
given through his attorney an opportunity to present arguments, this
opportunity loses its value if argument has to be directed into a vac-
uum. To argue his case ejectively, the lawyer must have some idea of
what is going on inside the judge's mind A more activeparticepation by
the judge--assuming it stops short ofa prejudgment of the case itsef--can
matter with the city, he probably would have been told that calling the victim would somehow
constitute an "admission" of the policemen's misconduct, and hence be introducible as evidence
against the city in the civil rights suit. But the arbitrator could have pointed out the probability
that (1) the very act of discharging the policemen was itself an "admission" and (2) introducing as
an exhibit in the arbitration a copy of the discharge letters was another "admission." For fuller
discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
Such education alone might result in the production of the witness. Indeed, in the policemen
discharge case the arbitrator's persistence-even without any effort to deal with the city's concern
about the civil rights suit-was apparently sufficient to induce the city to call the witness. The
city, however, did not actually call the witness.
42. For example, consider this case: A key witness is not produced, and the arbitrator in-
quires as to the reason. He is told that the witness is 74 years old and infirm. The obvious re-
sponse is to suggest that the parties take a deposition, or arrange a conference telephone call, in
which the arbitrator could listen to examination and cross-examination of the witness.
43. We are indebted to U.S. District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein (Chief Judge, Eastern
District of New York) for the descriptive terms, and for some ideas as to how the role can be
carried out, based on Judge Weinstein's own experience as a federal trial court judge.
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therefore enhance the meaning and effectiveness of an adversary
presentation.44
Professor Fuller has applied this argument to labor arbitration as
well.4 5 We would add that, if the arbitrator also assumes a "facilitat-
ing" role, he would further help the parties develop their best case and
thereby enhance the effectiveness of adversary presentation. If fairness
is to be served, the arbitrator must sometimes aid the parties by can-
didly disclosing his tentative appraisal of the factual issues, so that the
parties will be encouraged to bring forward additional evidence.
Party failure to develop the strongest possible case for its position
is not unusual.46 Sometimes it stems from the advocate's over-identifi-
cation with the interests of the client and the resulting partisanship.
More often, it comes from advocates in arbitration who are not trained
in law or in the marshalling and presentation of evidence. But even if
an advocate is highly skilled, he may be overburdened by excessive
caseloads, and may not recognize that he has overlooked a key witness.
Or he may recognize the problem but believe that it is too late to do
anything about it. These factors can either delude the advocate into
believing that he is performing well or produce an awareness that he is
not being effective without an accompanying understanding of just
what to do about it. An arbitrator may significantly aid a party by
pointing out an apparent weakness in its case.
Perhaps such considerations led the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors, the American Arbitration Association, and the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service to include in their Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility for labor arbitrators, as an "explanatory comment," the fol-
lowing: "An arbitrator may . . . request that the parties submit
additional evidence . . . at the hearing . . . ,47 That the arbitrator
may "request" the parties to produce a missing witness suggests at least
a modestly activist role. At a minimum, it assumes that an arbitrator
should not sit idly by if he believes he has not heard all the necessary
44. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30, 41 (1961) (emphasis
added).
45. "[I]t is the part of the wise arbitrator at some time, usually toward the end of the hearing,
to convey to the parties some notion of the difficulties he finds in supporting or in answering
certain of the arguments that have been addressed to him. . . . Such discussions, initiated by the
arbitrator himself, enhance meaningful participation by the parties in the decision and thus en-
hance the integrity of adjudication itself." Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH AN-
NUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 8, 25-26, 49A (1962).
46. Professor Robert Rabin, an experienced arbitrator, commenting on the quality of repre-
sentation in grievance arbitration cases, says, "Indeed, many cases, perhaps most, are not
presented very well." Rabin, The Impact of the Duty of Fair Representation Upon Labor Arbitra-
tion, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 851, 866 (1978).
47. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
DISPUTES § V(A)(1)(b) (National Academy of Arbitrators 1974).
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testimony.4 8
While many advocates will agree with our position,49 others may
feel that arbitrator intervention, even if limited to an educational and
facilitating role, will only help their opponent. Advocates who are bet-
ter trained, have smaller caseloads, or have more assistance than their
opponents may feel that any possible benefit to them will be out-
weighed by the benefits to their adversaries. They would prefer a pas-
sive arbitrator.
To this we have two responses. First, even the best advocate can
sometimes err. Accordingly, the question for the self-confident advo-
cate is whether she is willing to run the risk of losing a case because the
arbitrator has failed to speak up.
Our second response answers what is implicit in the argument of
the self-confident advocate: that the "free market" ought to be allowed
to operate in the arbitration context. In other words, "may the best
advocate win, and let the chips fall where they may." While we have
previously identified this as an argumentfor arbitrator inaction,50 we
believe that the free market analogy is simply inadequate in the arbi-
tration context.
In collective bargaining, where the issues are wages, hours, and
working conditions, a social consensus as to the proper resolution of the
issues is rarely to be found. For instance, there is no generally accepted
theory of distributive justice with ready answers to questions such as
"What is a fair wage?"5 Accordingly, in collective bargaining, it is
sensible to let "market forces" operate within very broad limits. Once a
contract has been forged, however, "justice" is more easily found, since
the search is narrowed considerably by the terms of the agreement.
The questions are no longer broad ones like "What is a fair wage?", but
narrower ones like "What are the grievant's rights under Article XIII,
Section 3, covering involuntary transfers?" To some considerable ex-
tent then, a just answer, an answer derived from the contract, can be
found.
48. The case for arbitral intervention could be put in terms of "righting the balance" be-
tween advocates of very uneven capability. We do not use this theory, although implementation
of the educational-facilitating role, as we define it, may often have this balancing effect. The
justification we offer (assuming the self-interest rationale for activism is rejected) is securing jus-
tice in arbitration; see inffra text accompanying notes 73-75.
49. That an advocate accepts the arbitral role suggested here, however, does not mean that
she will always be happy with the result. If, for instance, the arbitrator voices concern about a
missing witness, and the employer decides to produce the witness, and that witness' testimony
destroys the union's case, the union's advocate may be unhappy or even angry with the outcome.
However, so long as the union's advocate thinks the arbitrator acted properly and that he would
behave in the same fashion if the parties' positions were reversed, we need not concern ourselves
with the reaction to a particular exercise of that role.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
5I. See, e.g., N. RESCHER, DISTIUBUTIVE JUSTICE 73 (1966).
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Justice in a labor case is not only good in itself but can also serve
party self-interest. For employers, just results in arbitrations can pro-
mote labor peace, high morale among employees, and job satisfaction.
For unions, just awards avoid employer resentment and anger, which
can easily spill over into negative and hostile attitudes toward settle-
ment of grievances, and even into the negotiations for a new contract.
The question, then, for the advocate who believes that she is so compe-
tent that she will lose more than she will gain from arbitral activism is
whether she desires a just result or merely to win at all costs.
If parties accept our argument for a modest degree of arbitrator
activism, based upon their own self-interest, the risks that arbitrator
intervention will frustrate the goals of arbitration are slight. 2 If parties
believe that they will gain from the arbitrator's educator-facilitator
role, it presents little threat to the acceptability of awards, to the dig-
nity and autonomy of the parties, or to the reputation of labor arbitra-
tion generally.
B. Public Interest- A Broader Perspective
on the Educator-Facilitator Role
Quite apart from party self-interest, the public interest in labor ar-
bitration may justify the educator-facilitator role. The community has
an obvious interest in a dispute-settlement process that affects the vital
interests of thousands of employers and millions of workers in both the
private and public sectors. Society encourages, reinforces, and shapes
the use of the arbitral process. The provision for arbitral subpoena
power, 53 for example, or the rule that exclusion of pertinent evidence is
grounds for vacating an award, 54 suggests a legislative commitment to
truth-seeking. An arbitration statute in an important sense embodies
certain social values.
Thus, while the arbitrator owes his existence to the agreement of
the parties and these parties are given great latitude in structuring the
arbitral process, there are accepted principles and practices which limit
our deference to this consensual arrangement. For example, participa-
tion by an arbitrator in a rigged award is universally condemned. 55
Along the same lines, it is accepted practice-indeed, a responsibility of
the arbitrator under section 1I-I of the Code of Profession Responsibil-
ity-that the arbitrator examine and pass on the reasonableness of any
consent award. 6 These rules suggest values going beyond the self-in-
52. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
53. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1282.6 (West 1972).
54. See, e.g., id.
55. See supra note 8.
56. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
DISPUTES (National Academy of Arbitrators 1975).
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terest of the parties. Finally and generally, the social concern with the
quality of the employer-employee relationship may justify arbitral
activism.57
What then should society expect from arbitration? Justice is a
goal, both in itself, and as a means of attaining other goals, such as
labor peace. Since unjust decisions may cause unrest in the workplace,
and thereby hinder efficiency and productivity, the public has an inter-
est in just arbitration decisions. 8 Moreover, unjust decisions may be
resisted, leading to protracted litigation over the validity of the award.
Unjust decisions compromise the reputation of arbitration generally
and may therefore undermine its effectiveness as the last step in the
settlement of labor disputes. Society's interests in preserving industrial
peace, while protecting and promoting arbitration as an alternative to
oft-overworked judicial and administrative agencies, would conse-
quently be endangered. 9
Given the social interest in achieving justice in arbitration, it fol-
lows that procedures helping promote justice should be encouraged,
unless their costs are too high. Obviously, the development of a com-
plete record in arbitration-both testimonial and documentary-helps
produce accurate findings of fact, and hence lays the foundation for
correct application of legal standards (i.e., the provisions of the con-
57. Our promotion of the educator-facilitator role may find some support in the broad social
concern with the quality of the employer-employee relationship-a concern which goes beyond
the immediate parties and one to which the arbitrator should be sensitive. Obviously, as a society
we are well past the point where an employer can deal with employees as he wishes. Numerous
statutes have been enacted-for example, wage and hour, anti-discrimination, and occupational
health and safety legislation--evidencing social interest in the employment relationship. Al-
though these statutes address particular problems, together they evince a more general concern
with the quality of the employment relationship and its social impact. See general, Landis, Stat-
utes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934).
While one might plausibly argue that union and management know best what will promote
labor peace and therefore we should, at least presumptively, defer to their judgment, they are not
"experts" with respect to the broader social values by which society seeks to shape the relation-
ship. They are not the only interpreters of those values. Moreover, the concern is not limited to
the internal incidents and effects of the relationship but also includes the impact of the relation-
ship on society at large.
In speaking of this social concern and its implementation, we are not suggesting some literal
delegation of broad authority to the arbitrator to effect social policy but are rather only emphasiz-
ing the social context within which the arbitral process operates. Admittedly, these concerns pro-
vide a rather general foundation on which to build. But we often forget this social interest, and it
may provide weight for arbitral activism.
58. Justice in the arbitration process is important on both substantive and formal levels.
"Substantive justice" refers to satisfying reasonable expectations which derive from the contract.
"Formal justice" refers to equality of treatment among similarly situated persons, that is, consis-
tent application of rules.
59. For a strong statement of the public interest in arbitration, including its utility as an
instrument ofjustice for the industrial community, see Meltzer, Ruminatlins4About Ideology, Law,
and Labor Arbitration, in the Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 6-7 (1967).
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tract). If the arbitrator, by playing an educational and facilitating role,
can aid in developing a complete record, justice is served.
We can put our argument another way. Although the arbitrator's
primary responsibility is to the parties-the legal entities known as
"employer" and "union"-she also has responsibilities to others. She
has responsibilities to the grievant represented by the union, and to the
public and its interest in arbitral justice. The union is an artificial per-
son; so too usually is the employer. But real people are represented and
affected by these artificial entities; their interests must be protected as
well.
In our discharged police officer case,6' the city's advocate surely
realized that failure to call the arrestee seriously weakened his case.
Evidently he had decided that it was more important to protect the
municipal taxpayers from potential liability in a civil rights suit than to
insure that the discharge was upheld by the arbitrator. But who repre-
sented the interests of future arrestees who might come into contact
with the officer? And who represented the public interest in insuring
legally correct and humane treatment in its jails? Not the local prose-
cutor; he had already decided to leave the entire matter to the city to
handle through its discharge procedure. Perhaps the arrestee would
receive money damages from the city in his civil rights suit; but that
would not insure that the police officers-if they had abused their of-
fices-would be disciplined or discharged. Thus, if the arbitrator had
not intervened to inquire about the absence of a key witness, important
public interests could have suffered. 61
In short, social interest in justice, and the need for effective repre-
sentation of interests beyond those of employer and union, justify a
modest degree of arbitrator intervention to insure a complete record.
VI
THE EDUCATOR-FACILITATOR ROLE-
IS THE PRICE Too HIGH?
We have argued that, even if parties refuse to accept the educator-
facilitator role as a matter of party self-interest, the public interest in
truth-seeking and arbitral justice justifies that role. Performance of
that role, however, may undermine some of the goals of adjudication.
If so, we must weigh the costs against the benefits.
60. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
61. It is significant that, in the actual case, the arbitrator's decision to give lengthy suspen-
sions (without back pay) rather than discharge the offending policemen, drew criticism from the
media. This indicates that the public ir interested in the results of at least some arbitration pro-
ceedings, and helps refute the claim that arbitration is only a matter of self-government created by
and confined to the parties.
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If the arbitrator handles the missing witness problem in a clumsy
fashion-for instance, by raising the issue in a room full of people-he
could harm advocate dignity and adversely affect advocate-client rela-
tions. Common sense and tact, however, should normally prevent such
consequences.62
If arbitral intervention results either in the production of the wit-
ness or some adequate substitute, and the resulting testimony has a de-
cisive effect on the case, the losing party may become annoyed with the
arbitrator. This, in turn, might affect the acceptability of the award or
even damage the reputation of arbitration as a dispute-settlement
mechanism. On the other hand, if as we have argued, justice in arbitra-
tion is an exceptionally important goal, arbitrators should be prepared
to live with criticism resulting from disappointment. And since griev-
ance arbitration is well-rooted in American labor relations, occasional
and modest arbitrator activism will not seriously threaten its stature.
Arbitral activism arguably could encourage sloppiness and inade-
quate advocate preparation and presentation. There are at least two
answers to this contention. First, parties are entitled to know how their
case is viewed by the decision-maker; this benefit should not be sacri-
ficed merely to induce higher standards of advocacy. Second, arbitra-
tor intervention may actually encourage advocates to be more careful
in the future, both by showing them what to do, and by giving them an
incentive to avoid sloppy performance. No advocate wants the deci-
sion-maker to call attention to a deficiency in his presentation, no mat-
ter how tactfully the intervention is performed.
A further objection is that the arbitrator might not educate the
parties properly. This risk undeniably militates against the arbitral role
we espouse, but if the advocate has doubts, he can request a continu-
ance to do his own research and reach his own conclusions.
Still another possible cost of arbitral intervention could be inter-
ference with an advocate's strategy. Advocate A often knows in ad-
vance which witnesses his opponent (Advocate B) will call. The
arbitrator usually arrives at the hearing knowing nothing of the case,
let alone the possible need for an additional witness. If A knows that B
is not planning to call Witness W, A will probably decide not to call
Witnesses X and Y, whose testimony would contradict that of W. The
arbitrator, however, may decide that W's testimony is crucial, mention
it to the advocates, and be told by B that he will call W.
A now has to readjust his strategy and arrange for both the inter-
viewing of X and Y and their presence at the hearing. This is inconve-
nient, but is unlikely to do fundamental damage to A's case. Any claim
of surprise or lack of opportunity to present rebuttal testimony can be
62. See infra Section VII.A.
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remedied by granting a continuance so that A can prepare X and Y. Of
course, A might have preferred to present X and Y at some other point
in the hearings, but this tactical advantage does not seem important
enough to justify requiring the arbitrator to remain silent when she dis-
covers that an important witness will not testify.
Finally, it might be argued that an arbitrator who discovers the
absence of a key witness, and is successful in persuading one of the
parties to call her, may be so enamoured of his own contribution to the
proceedings as to be unable to appraise the resulting testimony fairly.
The witness, however, will be actually called and examined by an ad-
vocate, on the basis of her own judgment; the arbitrator has merely
suggested the calling of the witness.
To be sure, we could be mistaken about the apparently small costs
and large benefits of modest arbitral activism. But this additional step
in truth-seeking is not radical, and we believe that some arbitrators are
now doing some of what we suggest. 63 The arbitrator-author has tested
the educator-facilitator role without apparent adverse effects. We en-
courage arbitrators and parties to experiment with this role and deter-
mine whether, as we believe, the benefits greatly exceed the costs.
VII
THE EDUCATOR-FACILITATOR ROLE-SOME CONCRETE
SUGGESTIONS
Following is a series of suggestions describing how an arbitrator
should fill the educator-facilitator role. Not only will such suggestions
aid arbitrators who share our views, but more importantly, they will aid
the reader in appraising our analysis. Our suggestions begin with mini-
mum arbitrator involvement and work up to maximum action (i.e.,
calling the witness).
A. Making an Initial Approach
The arbitrator must first decide whether the missing testimony is
crucial. Sometimes, this will be difficult to determine, given that the
arbitrator may be unable to sort out the issues and marshal the facts in
the middle of a tense proceeding. When in doubt, though, he should
raise the missing witness issue. It would be better to discover then
whether he needs the evidence rather than to realize, weeks later, upon
63. Evidence on arbitrator custom and practice when the missing witness problem arises
would be helpful to our analysis. We have not attempted a survey here, however. We offer only
our impressions, based on observations and conversations with and about arbitrators. We think
that arbitral practice varies widely, with some arbitrators very passive and others quite active. We
also suspect that some arbitrators do not have a consistent approach to the problem, but vary their
conduct with the circumstances.
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reviewing the case, that he should have raised the matter with the
parties.64
The arbitrator must also decide whether non-production of the
witness-even though her testimony is crucial-is justified by some
other factor. For instance, if relatively little is at stake in the case and it
would require great effort and expense to locate the missing witness, it
would be sensible to drop the matter.
In making the above decisions, though, the arbitrator must be fully
aware of his own motives. Self-awareness must include efforts to avoid
any desire to dominate, to "show off" or to shock. Monetary self-inter-
est must also be considered. Often if the missing witness is to testify,
another hearing will be required and, since arbitrators are paid on a per
diem basis, another hearing may mean several hundred dollars more in
the arbitrator's pocket. It follows that, before deciding that the testi-
mony of a missing witness is essential, the arbitrator should be certain
that neither psychological nor monetary self-interest is at the root of the
decision to intervene.
The need for courtesy, tact, and good judgment requires little dis-
cussion. The advocate who has failed to call a witness-whether from
ignorance, carelessness, or deliberate decision-may resent arbitrator
intervention, especially when the "client," for example, the grievant or
the employer's chief executive officer, is present in the hearing room.
To avoid embarrassing a party, the arbitrator may communicate ex
parte with one of the advocates regarding the missing witness. We
counsel strongly against such a course of action. Exparte communica-
tions between decision-maker and advocate are frowned upon in all
parts of our legal system, and with good reason. The decision-maker
may learn something influential from one side to which the opposite is
never able to respond, thus subverting a basic principle of procedural
fairness. Moreover, for the arbitrator to be seen talking privately to
one side may excite suspicions and fears by the other side, and thus
compromise the apparent fairness of the proceeding.
We suggest the arbitrator talk privately with both advocates to
minimize the potential embarrassment. Such a private discussion, like
an in camera conference in judicial proceedings, might also prevent
"grandstanding" by the other advocate. That is, an advocate who ap-
preciates the reasons for the arbitrator's actions would be prevented
from protesting loudly and dramatically in the presence of the client.
Tact and skill may also be required when dealing with the party
who might be harmed by the witness' testimony. Its advocate may
wonder why the other side has not called a witness whose testimony
64. Of course, the arbitrator could request a reopening of the hearing, but this course of
action would create delay and additional expense, frustrating the avowed aims of arbitration.
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clearly would support its case. For the arbitrator to now ask about the
witness may dash hopes and provoke irritation. In such a situation, the
arbitrator may be called upon to justify his educator-facilitator role.
Indeed, he may have to have some courage to intervene at all; passivity
is the easier course of action. If a party challenges intervention as be-
yond the proper arbitral role, the arbitrator could perhaps respond that,
while the intervention aids the opponent in this instance, the tables
could be turned in the future. On an appropriate occasion, the arbitra-
tor may also wish to stress the public interest in arbitral justice.
Even after the arbitrator overcomes any initial negative reactions,
he may have to exercise considerable skill in identifying party motives,
evaluating the reasons given for failure to call the witness, and devising
imaginative solutions to problems. For instance, assume that the arbi-
trator has carefully considered the need for the missing testimony and
has concluded that the issue should be raised with the parties. He
should first note the absence of the witness and give his views as to why
the testimony seems important. Educating the parties in this fashion
may end the matter; the party which might have been expected to call
the witness may agree to do so. Often, however, the party may decline
to call the witness and may or may not state its reasons. The arbitra-
tor's role now is to ascertain the reasons underlying that decision, eval-
uate and discuss them with the parties, and, if necessary, suggest the
potential consequences of a failure to call, as well as possible alterna-
tives to calling, the witness.
Sometimes, the arbitrators will quickly be persuaded to drop the
matter. Imagine, for example, a discharge case in which the employer
has raised nine separate incidents of employee misconduct and poor
work performance. The arbitrator is dissatisfied with the testimony as
to one incident, and so informs the employer's advocate. The latter
replies that the particular incident of poor work performance is rela-
tively minor, and that the other eight incidents are more than sufficient
to sustain the charge. If the arbitrator concurs, the matter should be
dropped.
If the arbitrator continues to believe in the importance of the testi-
mony, however, he might suggest other methods of securing it. Sup-
pose the party explains its failure to call the witness on the ground that
she is in the hospital, or has moved away. The arbitrator should sug-
gest a written deposition, a videotaped deposition, or a visit by the par-
ties and the arbitrator to the hospital. Here, the arbitrator plays a
facilitating role.
B. Using the Rules of Evidence
The arbitrator can sometimes clear up the problem if he is aware
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of the rules of evidence and their relevance, if any, to arbitration pro-
ceedings. The following examples illustrate this point.
1. The Voucher Rule
The lawyer for one of the parties may argue that it is too risky to
call a witness whose testimony may be unfavorable because the
voucher rule precludes impeaching the witness' credibility.6" The
knowledgeable arbitrator will reply that the modern rules of evidence,
such as the federal rules,66 have abandoned the voucher rule and that
there is no reason for arbitrators to follow it. The arbitrator will thus
be able to reassure the advocate that, should the witness' testimony turn
out to be hostile, the advocate will nevertheless be free to cross-ex-
amine her own witness. The arbitrator might further explain that an
arbitrator will not identify a party with a particular witness to the detri-
ment of that party. While there may be such a risk in a jury trial, it is
absent in an arbitration.
Indeed, neither party may want to call a witness whose testimony
is uncertain. If, for instance, the witness is a fellow-employee of the
grievant, and an honest rendition of what she saw and heard would
hurt the grievant, the fellow-employee may feel caught in the middle.
If she tells the truth, she may incur the hostility of the grievant, other
fellow-employees, or the union. If she lies or shades the truth, she may
incur the hostility of the employer. Both parties will be aware of this,
and neither may want to risk calling the witness. The witness herself
may try hard to avoid becoming involved. Where the arbitrator senses
this problem (a red flag being any case in which the missing witness is a
fellow-employee of the grievant), the arbitrator should encourage the
parties to produce the witness. Besides assuring the parties that they
may cross-examine any witness they call, and that the decision-maker
will not identify the witnesses with the party which calls them, the arbi-
trator may point out that, although no one can be sure of the witness'
testimony, the evidence could be important to achieving a just result.
Possibly both parties could jointly call the witness with each free to
examine her at length.67
65. For discussion of the voucher rule, see E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 75-78 (2d
ed. 1972).
66. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 607.
67. Writing in 1958, Professor Willard Wirtz stated that traditional practice in arbitration
was for the employer not to call as witnesses fellow-employees of the grievant. Wirtz strongly
criticized this tradition, urging that, where necessary, the arbitrator himself call such a witness.
Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ELEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 18-19 (1958).
Whether or not this tradition still continues, we do not know. If it does, we would agree with
Wirtz's criticism, although we would favor the arbitrator's calling the witnesses only after the
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2. The Hearsay Rule
Imagine a case in which the party has introduced an eyewitness'
written statement. Although hearsay, the statement has been accepted
into evidence.68 To determine the weight to be given the statement,
however, the arbitrator must quickly decide whether the statement
either falls within an exception to the hearsay rule or has inherent relia-
bility. If neither, and the issue is a crucial one, the arbitrator will hesi-
tate to give much credence to the statement, given the absence of the
cross-examination safeguard. If she points this out to the appropriate
party as a part of her obligation to let the parties know her doubts and
concerns, the witness will often be produced so that through cross-ex-
amination all concerned will have greater assurance that the witness is
telling the truth.
3. Negative Inferences
While drawing inferences from a party's failure to call a witness is
a delicate matter, there are certainly some situations where it is appro-
priate to do so.69 Suppose that during a discharge case the union has
not produced an alibi witness, who is the discharged grievant's friend
and has no connection with the employer. The arbitrator could appro-
priately draw an inference against the union that the friend's testimony
would be unfavorable. There would appear to be few other reasons
why the union would not produce the witness. If such an inference is
appropriate, the arbitrator should point this out to the union's advo-
cate. The advocate would thus be given an opportunity to produce the
witness or explain why the witness has not been called.
4. The Burden of Proof
Occasionally, the arbitrator can induce a party to call the missing
witness by candidly stating his tentative view of the weight of the evi-
dence on the issue, and how that relates to the burden and standard of
proof. Consider again the police discharge case70 and assume that the
employer has introduced several witnesses in support of its claim that
the policemen assaulted the arrestee. The union has also introduced
much contrary testimony. The arbitrator cannot determine what oc-
curred in the police station. He does know that the arrestee has not
been called, that the burden of proof in a discharge case is on the em-
educational and facilitating role has been tried and failed. Even then, we suggest a very cautious
approach.
68. Most arbitrators will admit hearsay into evidence, but give it only "the weight it
deserves."
69. See E. CLEARY, supra note 65, at 656-58.
70. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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ployer, and that, because the conduct charged involves criminal behav-
ior, the standard of proof which arbitrators usually require is "beyond
a reasonable doubt."'" The arbitrator should point out these three facts
to the employer's advocate, so that the advocate is fully aware of the
risk he is running by failing to call the arrestee.
C Evaluating Parties' Tactics
There will be times when a Party A justifies the failure to call a
crucial witness on "tactical" grounds. The arbitrator ought not to ac-
cept this explanation at face value and should instead ask opposing
Party B whether it will call the witness. Since A's "tactical" reason for
not calling a witness may well be a belief that the witness' testimony
will help B, the arbitrator's question directed to B may result in B call-
ing the witness, now that B has been "educated" about the importance
of the testimony.
On the other hand, A's reluctance may be for other reasons, such
as doubt as to whether the witness observed enough of the disputed
event to make his testimony worthwhile. In this situation, B may have
the same doubts. B may feel satisfied with its case and believe that it is
A's burden to produce the witness. This would force A to call the wit-
ness, or to adhere to its "tactical decision," or to reveal its real motives.
No script can be written for the arbitrator in this situation. Appropri-
ate responses range from dropping the matter altogether to stating an
intention to draw an adverse inference against one of the parties.
It is even possible that both parties may rely upon a "tactical deci-
sion" to justify a failure to call the witness. Here too the arbitrator
should inquire further. Perhaps this case is a rigged award and a wit-
ness' testimony would exculpate the discharged employee. Since it is
generally agreed that arbitrators have some responsibility for prevent-
ing such abuses of the arbitral process,7" the arbitrator should explore
further why neither side will call a key witness.
D. Exploring the Potential Relationships Between the Arbitration and
Other Proceedings
Sometimes the arbitrator can eliminate the problem of the missing
witness if he knows how other legal proceedings operate. In our police
discharge case,13 the arbitrator could suggest that the arbitration be ad-
journed pending completion of the federal civil rights suit, thus obviat-
71. Where the grounds for discharge involve conduct which is criminal in nature, many
arbitrators will apply the criminal standard of proof, rather than the "preponderance of the evi-
dence standard." F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 623 (3d ed. 1973) and
cases cited therein.
72. See Fuller, supra note 36, at 20-22.
73. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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ing the city's need to call the arrestee in the arbitration until that time.
Indeed, the pending arbitration may convince the federal court to ad-
vance the civil rights suit on its calendar in order to prevent undue
delay of the discharge dispute.
Similarly, if a criminal action against the policemen were pending,
the arbitrator might suggest postponing the arbitration until the crimi-
nal case is resolved. If the case results in a conviction, the grievant
probably would not pursue his grievance. Even if grievant and union
elect to continue with the arbitration, under modem rules of evidence,
the conviction would be admissible in the arbitration,74 and thus would
aid the decision on the grievance. If the criminal case against the po-
lice officers results in an acquittal, the employer might decide to drop
the matter. If the employer continues to press the discharge case in the
arbitration, the judgment of acquittal-assuming that the arbitrator
would apply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof 5 -
could be accepted into evidence.76 Postponement of the arbitration, in
some cases, might also help assure the fairness of the criminal trial by
preventing prejudicial publicity which could follow an arbitral finding
of guilt.77
On some occasions, a party will state its reason for declining to call
a witness, and assessment of the validity of that reason will require
legal research and probably an adjournment. In our police discharge
illustration,78 the city's advocate might explain his reluctance to call the
alleged victim as a witness on the ground that such an act would consti-
tute an "admission" of the police officers' misconduct, introducible as
evidence against the city in the civil rights suit.79 The arbitrator should
request that the advocate consider the possibility that the city's conduct
to date already constitutes an admission, and that calling the witness
will not add to the risk of losing the civil rights suit. Specifically, the
arbitrator should suggest that the very act of discharging the policemen
was an admission, and that the further act of introducing the letter of
74. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803 (22), making admissible in other legal proceedings, judg-
ments of conviction of an offense for which the penalty could be death or a sentence in excess of
one year's imprisonment.
75. Seesupra note 71.
76. Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) could not be invoked against the employer since he
had no opportunity to litigate the matter in the criminal trial; the prosecutor was the moving
party.
77. The effect of a criminal proceeding upon a subsequent arbitration is a complex one.
However, the position taken here is reasonably consistent with that taken by Zack and Bloch, in
their American Arbitration Association Study Guide, THE ARBITRATION OF DISCIPLINE CASES:
CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS 67-68 (1979).
78. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
79. See FED. R. Evw. 613.
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discharge in the arbitration proceeding was an additional admission."0
Presumably, then, not much more damage could be done if the arrestee
appeared and testified.
E Raising Broader Issues
On occasion, of course, the arbitral intervention outlined above
will not result in the witness being called. In such instances, and as-
suming the arbitrator is still convinced of the necessity of the testimony,
the educational role we envision for the arbitrator would justify raising
even broader questions with the advocates. For example, the arbitrator
might ask if a bad decision in this case would worsen relations in the
workplace. The reader might recall here our previous discussion of the
relationship between arbitral justice and labor peace."' As Dean Shul-
man has stated, "A court's erroneous findings of fact in a particular
litigation may work an injustice to the litigants but rarely disturb the
future; similar error by an arbitrator may cause more harm by dis-
turbing the parties' continuing relationship than by the injustice in the
particular case.""
The arbitrator might also ask if the decision will set a precedent
for the parties in this plant and/or in other employer facilities. If so,
the parties may want to insure that a complete record is developed.83
Further, the arbitrator might want to point out to a recalcitrant union
the danger of a duty of fair representation suit by the grievant should
the union lose.84 Because such suits often involve the employer as co-
defendant, the employer's advocate may also have an interest in this
issue. The arbitrator must make clear that she is not making a threat,
but seeks only to prevent further litigation with its attendant expense,
delay, and uncertainty. Furthermore, the matter should not be raised
in front of the grievant, lest the arbitrator be accused of encouraging a
suit against the employing parties.
Different adverse consequences could follow for an employer, or
its advocate, if the employer performs miserably in arbitration and
loses the case. Outside counsel always face the possibility of a malprac-
tice claim. Or, in our police discharge case,85 an unwarranted or suspi-
cious failure to call the arrestee could lead to bad publicity, an official
80. For discussion of these kinds of admissions, see CLEARY, supra note 65, at 630-31, 635,
650-51.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
82. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1017-18
(1955).
83. Of course., the arbitrator usually will not know the answers to questions of this sort, but
this should not deter him from raising them with the parties.
84. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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investigation, or even some form of litigation against those responsible
for the failure to prosecute the case with due diligence. For example, a
poorly prepared, half-hearted arbitration presentation by the city
might, we think, be used as evidence in a federal civil rights suit against
the city for failure to discipline police in the face of numerous com-
plaints.86 In addition, the advocate's behavior may raise the spectre of
collusion and may thus involve a violation of professional ethics. A
municipal attorney's ongoing relationship with the police may be so
close that it would be professionally irresponsible for the attorney to
handle a police-discharge case.87 Poor performance in arbitration may
be evidence that there was in fact a conflict of interest and that the
attorney should not have been involved in the adversarial proceeding
against these municipal employees. In situations such as these the arbi-
trator would be justified in advising the employer's advocate of the po-
tential consequences.
F Calling a Witness with Party Approval
Finally, the arbitrator may occasionally have to call the witness as
his own, but at the request of one or both parties. Party A may believe
that it would jeopardize its interests by calling the witness in the arbi-
tration, but be perfectly willing or even eager to have someone else call
the witness. We see no reason why the arbitrator should not do this,
even to the point of using his subpoena power, if necessary. Party B
may protest, probably out of a desire to avoid unfavorable testimony.
The arbitrator may therefore have to defend his intervention both on
grounds of party self-interest and the public interest in arbitral
justice.88
Both parties might request, or be persuaded by the arbitrator to
agree to, his summoning of the witness. A good example is the fellow-
employee/witness case, described above.89 If neither party will call
such a witness, and if the parties decline to call her as a joint witness,
perhaps they might be induced to let the arbitrator call the witness as
his own. 90
86. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1976); see also Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (municipality is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 and can therefore be sued
under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief). But see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976).
87. Perillo v. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 83 N.J. 366, 416 A.2d 801 (1980)
(appropriate representational responsibilities of municipal attorneys in adversarial proceedings
against municipal employees).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 41-61.
89. See supra text accompanying note 67.
90. As we will discuss more fully in Section VILLA. infra, an arbitrator's calling and ques-
tioning a witness creates the danger of arbitral identification with the witness. This risk, however,
seems worthwhile, especially since the witness will be available for cross examination.
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VIII
SHOULD THE ARBITRATOR EVER CALL THE WITNESS OVER
THE PARTIES' OBJECTION?
If the arbitrator skillfully plays the educator-facilitator role, he
will often succeed in having the witness produced, or in securing some
satisfactory substitute, such as a deposition. Sometimes, however, the
party which ought to produce the witness will steadfastly decline to do
so. The advocate for that party may argue that the expense and delay
involved in holding another hearing solely to hear the witness out-
weighs the benefit of such additional testimony. On a broader level,
the advocate may argue that it is more important to protect and main-
tain some other interest of his client than it is to win the arbitration.
Or, the advocate may offer a flimsy excuse and the arbitrator may sus-
pect that the case involves a "rigged award."
Should the arbitrator now call the witness himself? A decision to
do this is more serious than playing the limited educator-facilitator
role, because its potential costs in terms of the various goals of adjudi-
cation 91 are greater. For instance, calling the witness presents a greater
threat to the arbitrator's actual or perceived impartiality in appraising
the credibility and importance of the witness' testimony. If the em-
ployee is in the public sector, arbitral intervention arguably would in-
terfere with the democratic process, that is, the authority of elected and
politically responsible officials to make choices among competing goals.
For example, if a city, in a case involving discharge of a policeman for
abuse of authority, chooses to protect good relations with the police
union and with the police force by not exerting maximum efforts to
sustain the discharge of the erring officer, there is a strong argument
that the arbitrator should not question the city's judgment.
Deciding whether or not to call the witness will often be delicate
and difficult, and we cannot lay down any simple rules for handling the
problem. Instead, we will list and discuss the factors which the arbitra-
tor should consider before arriving at a decision. We then describe
three hypothetical cases to shed further light on the problem.
A. Factors
1. Importance of the Missing Testimony
Before calling the witness, the arbitrator should reexamine the
conclusion that the testimony is necessary. The arbitrator should be
aware of the possible illegitimate motives that may influence his deci-
sion. For example, he may be influenced to adhere to his original judg-
ment by factors such as the desire to seem firm and consistent, a
91. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
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possible interest in extending the case to increase the fee, or a felt need
to dominate the proceedings. There may be factors pulling him in the
other direction: if he is to maintain personal "acceptability," a concern
often felt by tenureless arbitrators, he will hesitate to annoy a party by
taking a strong opposing stand. Or the arbitrator may want to "get this
case over with," so that he can go on with other work. Although these
factors make it difficult to rationally decide whether the witness is truly
essential, the arbitrator must try.
2. Reasons Given for Not Calling the Witness
In assessing the reasons a party gives for declining to call a wit-
ness, the arbitrator must first try to determine a party's real motivations.
It is possible, for example, that a party will not respond truthfully to the
arbitrator's question. If the reason given for not calling the witness
seems unconvincing, the arbitrator should inquire further in an attempt
to discern the true "hidden agenda."92 In many situations he can be
reasonably confident that the party's response is honest. For example,
imagine a discharge case involving a police officer who caused a good
deal of trouble for his superiors and was unpopular with other police
officers. Since good labor relations with the police force appear not to
be at stake and it is clear that the city wants to win the case, the reason
it offers for not producing a key bystander witness-"we cannot find
him"-is believable. In other situations this same reason might strike
the arbitrator as transparent or unbelievable. As with any other in-
quiry, the arbitrator must assess the credibility of the speaker and the
plausibility of his statements in light of the circumstances. In any case,
the difficulties often involved in identifying and evaluating a party's
reasons argue for considerable caution on the part of the arbitrator.
Assuming that the arbitrator has satisfied herself that she knows
the real reason why the party will not call the witness, she must next
appraise the validity of those reasons, e.g., whether producing the wit-
ness here would really damage the party's interest in another forum.
The arbitrator must also weigh the substantiality of the interest which
the party seeks to promote by its refusal to call a certain witness. The
arbitrator must ask, for instance, if it is a purely pecuniary interest or
outright indifference as to who wins the case.
Cases at the extremes illuminate the kind of analysis necessary. If,
in a case without precedential value and involving $100 in holiday pay,
the employer's advocate says that it simply is not worthwhile for his
92. The arbitrator may face a dilemma here. It may be that a party would disclose his real
motive in a private conversation but would not make such a disclosure in front of the other party.
However, a private conversation would entail an exparle communication and such communica-
tions are improper. See supra text following note 64.
[Vol. 5:87
PROBLEM OF MISSING WITNESS
client to spend $150 obtaining a deposition from a witness living
abroad, the matter should be dropped. Contrast the employee dis-
charge case where the performance of the union's advocate has been so
poor, and his reasons for declining the arbitrator's request to call the
witness so specious, that the arbitrator suspects that the union wants the
discharge upheld. This suspicion should push the arbitrator in the di-
rection of calling the witness.
In appraising party reasons for declining to call a witness, and
party interests, a factor to be considered is the limited "right" of a party
to lose its own case. We do not believe that a party must use maximum
effort to win every case. Within the limits imposed by the duty of fair
representation and similar principles, a party is not even required to
carry every dispute to arbitration.93 It can concede at an early stage of
the grievance procedure, or compromise the case, even though it thinks
that it might prevail in arbitration. Even when the party goes to arbi-
tration, its duty has limits. For instance, it is not required to hire the
best labor lawyer in town. A union has a right to use a staff representa-
tive, and the employer cannot be faulted if it uses its director of indus-
trial relations. It follows from these propositions that a party is
sometimes entitled to not call a witness, even though the refusal might
jeopardize its chances of winning.
Suppose an important eyewitness to an occurrence is the president
of the local union. His testimony is likely to be unfavorable to the
union and the union does not call him. But the employer also fails to
call him, possibly in order to avoid embarrassing the union official and
incurring his wrath. If the arbitration happens to occur at a crucial
point in the negotiations for a new three-year contract, the employer
may rationally conclude that its overall interest in good labor relations
is more important than its interest in winning this one arbitration.
3. Protecting Third-Party Interests
The arbitrator must, of course, be greatly concerned with protect-
ing the individual interest of the grievant, who is not an actual party to
the litigation. In the normal discharge case, for example, a decision
sustaining the discharge may be more serious for the grievant than a
minor criminal prosecution. It is arguable, therefore, that it is more
important to insure that a witness for the individual employee be called
than to require a witness for the employer to be called. We might feel a
greater sense of injustice if an employee is wrongfully discharged than
if an employee who ought to have been discharged is instead reinstated.
There will be other cases where group or collective interests will be
93. The union however cannot "arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance." Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
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of extreme importance. In our police discharge case,94 the interests of
future arrestees and of the public in humane and legally correct treat-
ment in jails is of major concern. In some cases, the arbitrator may be
concerned about the effects of a bad decision on labor peace.95 Yet the
arbitrator may be less adept than the parties in predicting the impact of
a particular decision on labor relations in the particular enterprise. Ac-
cordingly, he should be cautious in invoking maintenance of good la-
bor relations as a rationale for calling a witness.
There may also be cases where a party justifies a refusal to call a
witness by pleading the interests of some third party. Take this case as
an example: The school board has discharged an employee for alleg-
edly making improper statements to a nine-year-old girl. The child has
given a statement, which the board has introduced into evidence. The
arbitrator is not satisfied with this hearsay and asks that the girl be
called to testify. The board's advocate declines, arguing that it would
be too embarrassing for the girl, and might even cause her permanent
psychological damage.
The arbitrator should not accept this judgment too quickly. The
board has no special competence in determining the effects of testifying
on small children; the arbitrator might be just as competent. The par-
ents of the girl, who have the most direct interest and the greatest com-
petence, should be consulted. And the imaginative arbitrator, before
deciding what to do, will consider how harm to the potential witness
could be minimized. For example, she could exclude the press, public,
and other witnesses. In short, in deciding whether to call the witness,
the arbitrator must carefully weigh the importance of unrepresented or
poorly-represented interests.
4. Potential Precedential Value of the Decision
Precedential value for the parties has already been mentioned.96
But a decision in a particular arbitration may have implications for
other employers and unions in future cases.
Consider this example: A dairy has discharged an employee be-
cause he refuses to shave his beard; the dairy claims at the hearing that
the beard threatens the purity of its products. The union responds that
a snood (a kind of hair net) covering the beard provides adequate pro-
tection. The employer denies this. Neither party has called an expert
witness, or, alternatively, both have called expert witnesses and their
testimony is in hopeless conffict. The arbitrator wishes to hear an "im-
partial" expert witness, but the parties will not cooperate. If the arbi-
94. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
96. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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trator knows that "beard" cases are currently an important issue in the
settlement of grievances, he might reason that his decision could influ-
ence other decisions. Such reasoning might persuade him to call an
expert witness himself.
More broadly, we are now confronting the distinction between ar-
bitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes, and arbitration as an
institution for generating rules.97 In almost all adjudication, of course,
there will be present an element of both dispute settlement and rule
generation. To the extent that the parties take into account the results
and justifications of prior arbitration awards (whether or not an opin-
ion was written) the resolution of even one dispute will have effects
extending beyond the immediate controversy. But it is helpful for ana-
lytical clarity to view the two functions as separate.
If dispute resolution, or rule generation for the parties, is primary,
a strong (but not always compelling) case can be made for the proposi-
tion that the adjudicator should remain within the parameters set by
the parties' presentation of proofs and arguments. If the emphasis,
however, is on rulemaking for these and other parties, our attitude may
well shift. Even though an arbitrator's decision lacks the legal force of
a statute or administrative regulation, or the compelling force of stare
decisis, it may nonetheless affect the decisions of others. The arbitral
decision may have special weight if the arbitrator is well-known and
highly respected. In these circumstances, limiting the arbitrator to the
evidence and arguments made by the parties, in the name of respon-
siveness to party concerns, exacts a high price. The arbitrator must
carefully consider whether that price ought to be paid.
The problem of accurately deciding a precedential case will be es-
pecially acute when technical matters are involved, as in the dairy ex-
ample. Where neither party wants to produce an expert witness, and
the arbitrator must resolve highly technical matters on an inadequate
factual basis, the argument for the arbitrator calling an "impartial" ex-
pert is particularly compelling.
98
97. In his elaboration and qualification of Professor Fuller's work on adjudication, Professor
Eisenberg distinguishes between rule generation and dispute settlement. See Eisenberg, Participa-
tion, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process. 4n Essayfor Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REv. 410,
412-13 (1978).
98. Apparently, judges will unilaterally call witnesses where expert testimony is necessary to
render coherent and to clarify complex or confused issues. See Scott v. Spanjer Bros., 298 F.2d
928 (2d Cir. 1962).
In these cases the judge may believe that he is doing more than settling a dispute. In certain
situations rule generation may be his primary function, and the input of the parties may not
adequately address factors which bear on the formulation of a sound, long-term rule. Since the
rules he sets down must take account of applications to persons removed from the current parties
and must be responsive to these other persons' needs as well, it is not surprising that in such
situations he looks for expert aid. The need for, and the extent of, such a practice will vary
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5. Fairness of the Hearing
If the arbitrator calls the witness he may be forced to conduct the
questioning himself, with all the attendant risks to neutrality. Al-
though the parties can then cross-examine, a danger still exists that the
arbitrator will identify with the witness and her testimony. The deci-
sion to call the witness follows a serious controversy with one or both
parties, and the arbitrator, in an understandable desire to justify a con-
troversial decision, may exaggerate the credibility and importance of
the witness. The arbitrator may even have a preordained view of what
the witness will say, and may steer the witness toward a particular ver-
sion of the disputed events. The arbitrator may also protect the witness
against cross-examination which threatens the integrity of that version,
by, for example, sustaining objections to questions.
On the other hand, a concern for maintaining neutrality (real and
perceived) may lead the arbitrator to over-compensate and give less
weight to the testimony than it deserves. Further, the arbitrator may be
in a very difficult position if a party objects to some of the arbitrator's
own questions, for instance, on grounds that they are leading or
irrelevant.
In theory, the arbitrator may be able to coolly appraise the credi-
bility and importance of the testimony, even during his own question-
ing. In practice, though, this may be difficult.9 9 Even if the arbitrator
believes himself capable of such a role-change, the losing party may
not believe in the arbitrator's capacity to do so, especially if the testi-
mony ultimately influences the decision. It is apparent that the arbitra-
tor must carefully consider this real, and perceived, threat to
impartiality.
6. Practical Problems
There may be expense associated with calling the "missing wit-
ness," such as a fee for an expert witness, or travel for a witness who
must come from substantial distance. Normally, each party pays for its
own witnesses. If a party objects to calling the witness, will it pay for
such witness, or share expenses with the non-objecting party? Will the
non-objecting party pay all such expenses? If the problem cannot be
worked out with the parties, the arbitrator will have to investigate the
subpoena powers to determine whether there is provision for paying
witnesses.
according to the nature of the inquiry and the quality of the parties' participation. But a willing-
ness to resort to it in rule-making situations is understandable.
99. See Professional Responsibility. Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160-61
(1958).
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7 Finality of the Decision
In our police discharge case,"°° failure to call the arrestee could
easily result in an arbitral decision to set aside the discharge and order
reinstatement of the policemen. That would be a disturbing resolution
of the problem. But suppose the arbitrator knows that a criminal ac-
tion against the policemen is pending. In that event, the arbitrator
might rationalize a decision not to go beyond an educa-
tional/facilitating role in the arbitration on the ground that the crimi-
nal trial is likely to produce a complete record and a just result. That
is, the prosecutor in the criminal case will almost surely call the arrestee
as a state's witness, thus making available to the decision-maker (judge
or jury) that crucial testimony.
8. Party's Legal Duty to Call the Witness
If, for instance, the arbitrator believes that the union's failure to
call the witness may involve a breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion, '' he should seriously consider calling the witness himself. This
might save grievant, union, and employer the expense and delay associ-
ated with a fair representation suit, as well as promote justice in the
arbitration. Gross and Bordoni, in their thoughtful article on the re-
sponsibilities of the arbitrator to enforce the duty of fair representa-
tion, 10 2 argue that the arbitrator should call a witness even if the
union's failure to do so might not be so culpable as to involve a breach
of its duty of fair representation, so long as the testimony seems critical
to protect the grievant's interest.
0 3
We do not go so far as Gross and Bordoni. Even if the arbitrator
is convinced that the union has breached its duty of fair representation,
he should consider other factors, such as the danger of jeopardizing the
fairness of the arbitration proceeding, when deciding whether to call
the witness himself. Moreover, the stronger the case against the union,
the more likely it is that pointing this out to the union and employer
will induce the union to call the witness itself.'" 4
9. Public or Private Status of the Arbitrator
Most arbitrators are "private" in that they are selected by the par-
ties and do not occupy any official role. Some arbitrators, however, by
100. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 40 and 84.
102. Gross & Bordoni, Reflections on the Arbitrator's Responsibility to Provide a Full and Fair
Hearing: How to Bite the Hands Thai Feed You, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 877 (1978).
103. Id. at 892-96.
104. See supra text accompanying note 84. Gross and Bordoni do not discuss in any depth
the possibility that the arbitrator might achieve the results desired by playing an educational-
facilitating role.
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virtue of their membership in state or federal mediation agencies, oc-
cupy governmental positions since they are selected and paid by the
state. Government arbitrators may be perceived as similar to judges
and thus as having more responsibility for "doing justice" than would
be the case for their private counterparts. The importance of this factor
is hard to gauge; but public arbitrators ought at least to consider it
when confronting a missing witness problem.
10. Misuse of Precedent
Use of a power in one instance may furnish an excuse for misuse
of that power by someone else in another case. But this danger seems
minimal in the context of arbitration because the need for "acceptabil-
ity" is a very powerful check on arbitral misuse of power. Indeed, we
think there is greater danger of under-use of arbitral power-including
even the modest role of educator-facilitator-than there is of misuse of
the power. Tenureless arbitrators may sometimes have to show cour-
age and commitment if they are to be faithful to their multiple
responsibilities.
11. Reputation of Arbitration
A failure to call the witness may result in a decision perceived as
unfair and unjust by those with knowledge of the real facts with attend-
ant damage to the reputation of arbitration.10 5 On the other hand, the
parties--or at least the losing party-may deeply resent the arbitrator's
"taking over the case." The parties may regard arbitration as a less
attractive form of dispute resolution. It may be that the first argument
favoring the arbitrator's decision to call a missing witness will prove
more persuasive; observers of the process, including the public, may
tend to judge arbitration more by its results than by its procedures.
Depending on the facts in the particular case, some of the above
factors will push the arbitrator toward calling the witness, while others
will push in the opposite direction. We suspect, though, that it will be
the rare case in which the arbitrator will feel constrained to call the
witness himself. We think that an educational-facilitating approach
will usually succeed in producing the witness or some acceptable sub-
stitute. When this does not occur, and the arbitrator is still persuaded
that the testimony is critical, the factors arguing for deferring to party
objections may often outweigh the factors arguing for calling the
witness. 106
105. See supra text accompanying note 82.
106. Not to be overlooked is an arbitrator's self-interest in not upsetting the parties with his
interventions. "Acceptability" may influence the arbitrator in not calling the witness. However,
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B. Examples
Finally, to shed further light on how these factors might operate in
concrete cases, we offer the following three illustrations.
1. The case involves only a small amount of money. No impor-
tant third-party or public interests are involved. The decision will have
no precedential value. If the witness is not called, it is unlikely that
either party would be criticized or penalized in some other forum (a
court, a union membership meeting, a newspaper editorial, etc.) for
having failed to do so. While the missing testimony is very important,
the cost in dollars to obtain it is almost as great as the amount in dis-
pute. Moreover, calling the witness would mean another hearing and
thus additional expense and delay. The arbitrator discusses the matter
with the parties and one party strongly opposes calling the witness; the
other party is indifferent.
Given facts like these, the arbitrator should not call the witness;
the price of perfect justice would be too high.
2. The case is our police discharge case, 07 and the missing wit-
ness is the arrestee, who is also the plaintiff in the civil rights suit
against the city. The overall performance of the city's lawyer during
the hearing has not been impressive, and his argument for the city's
refusal to call the witness-that it would prejudice the city's defense in
the other litigation-is of doubtful validity. The local prosecutor has
decided not to criminally prosecute the two policemen.
The hearing has gone on for several days, and the arbitrator, a
member of a public arbitration tribunal, has not had a chance to ap-
praise and weigh the mass of testimony. His tentative judgment, how-
ever, is that the case is a close one, and could come out either way.
Thus, the testimony of the arrestee could conceivably be the decisive
factor. If the arrestee's story stands up under cross-examination, the
discharge will probably be upheld. On the other hand, if the arrestee's
story is weak, in all likelihood the policemen will be found innocent of
wrongdoing. In that event, a great injustice to the officers and their
families would have been prevented. The arbitrator is reasonably con-
fident that, if he calls the witness, the city will undertake the question-
ing, or if not, that he can perform the task without seriously
compromising his neutrality.
The city has not argued that lenience towards the officers is essen-
the fear of losing acceptability may cut both ways. On one hand, the arbitrator may refrain from
calling the witness because he does not want to antagonize a party. On the other hand, if either or
both parties detect this bowing to party pressure threatening economic loss, they may lose confi-
dence in the arbitrator's integrity. In any event, we hope and expect that most arbitrators will not
put their self-interest above their responsibilities.
107. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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tial to maintaining good relations with the union or with individual
officers, nor does the arbitrator believe that this is a hidden goal of the
city. The arbitrator is satisfied that if he chooses to protect the civil
rights of the arrestee, at the possible cost of exposing the city to liability
in the civil rights suit, such a choice would reflect the importance our
society places upon the legal and personal protection of arrestees.
10 8
On facts such as these, the arbitrator would be justified in calling the
witness himself, even if such action would anger the city and its
advocate.
3. The case arises in a small town, in which there is only one
hospital. The hospital has discharged a maintenance man for allegedly
making an indecent proposal to a 16-year-old female patient, while she
was in her hospital room. There were no other eyewitnesses. The girl
gave a full statement to the hospital authorities within a few minutes of
the incident and this statement has been introduced in evidence.
The employee has testified and has denied everything. The hospi-
tal's advocate has asked the girl to appear and testify, but she declines
because she does not want to be further involved. The arbitrator (se-
lected from an American Arbitration Association panel) has suggested
that the hospital subpoena the girl, but the hospital's advocate declines.
He gives two reasons for this action: (1) The hospital does not want to
offend the girl, a member of a prominent family which has given strong
financial support and leadership to the hospital, and (2) forcing this
patient to testify might discourage other patients (or even employees)
from coming forward with derogatory information about employees in
sensitive situations.
On facts like these, the arbitrator's choice is a perplexing one.
Considerable merit inheres in both the hospital's arguments. On the
other hand, without the girl's testimony, the employer's case is weak
and the discharge unlikely to be sustained. If the employee is rein-
stated, and if he had indeed been guilty of misconduct, he might repeat
108. Arbitrators sometimes are called upon to make a choice between competing values or
goals, even though their choice is different from that of a public sector employer, and therefore
arguably an interference with the democratic process. Suppose, for instance, that a city discharges
an employee because he filed a worker's compensation claim. At the arbitration the city claims
that its interest in employee "loyalty" and in saving money outweighs the individual's right to
pursue a legal right. No one would fault an arbitrator who disagreed with the city, and held that
the discharge, because it conflicted with an important individual right, was not for "just cause."
Though our problem is procedural rather than substantive, the analogy is clear: arbitrators
may occasionally refuse to defer to the value choices of elected public officials, and such refusal is
appropriate.
In the instant case, the choice between competing goals would be more difficult if the arbitra-
tor knew, or suspected, that the city's motive was to avoid creating difficulties with the police
force. Under those circumstances, the efficiency of the police force would be implicated, and the
arbitrator might decide to let the responsible elected officials make the difficult choice between
two important goals.
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the misconduct, or even do something far worse. Calling the witness
might prevent harm to some future hospital patient. But it might also
harm the hospital; the girl and her family might blame the hospital, not
the arbitrator, for involving the girl in the arbitration. And other em-
ployees might hesitate to "turn people in." Should either occur, the
hospital's view of arbitration will not be enhanced. Of course, the hos-
pital could rescind the discharge and moot the arbitration once it
learned of the arbitrator's intention to call the girl. But this might em-
barrass the hospital, and could lead to public criticism.
Some of the factors we have discussed, such as the precedential
value of the decision, seem irrelevant to this case. Other factors are
relevant. These include the importance of the testimony, the strength
of the hospital's reasons for refusing to call the witness, non-parties'
interests, the effect on the fairness of the hearing, and possible damage
to the reputation of arbitration, as well as doubt about the relative
weight of these factors. The arbitrator's decision is indeed a very diffi-
cult one. In making that decision, she may wish to consult not only the
parties but other arbitrators.
IX
SHOULD THE ARBITRATOR DISCUSS THE "MISSING
WITNESS" ISSUE IN THE OPINION?
When the arbitrator writes the opinion, he will have to consider
whether to discuss the "missing witness" issue. The answer will vary
with the circumstances.
If the arbitrator decided to call the witness over party objection, he
should discuss the issue and his reasons for calling the witness in the
opinion. Such discussion, at minimum, would tend to convince the
parties that he took their arguments seriously. Moreover, it might per-
suade the objecting party or parties of the wisdom of the decision, and
might fend off criticism from others who learn about it. Moreover, a
thorough, reasoned discussion in the opinion will help build a body of
precedent, of value to other unions, employers, and arbitrators.
At the other extreme, if the parties and the arbitrator find a solu-
tion which meets his standards, e.g., he is persuaded that the testimony
is not really crucial, or that the costs (monetary and otherwise) exceed
the benefits of the testimony, he may choose to mention the matter only
briefly or ignore it altogether. At all costs, he should avoid embarrass-
ing either party or praising himself. On the other hand, if he and the
parties have arrived at an imaginative solution to a particular problem,
others may benefit if it is mentioned in the opinion.
In the middle of the spectrum will be those cases in which the
arbitrator is dissatisfied with the outcome. For instance, he may still
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consider the testimony crucial or believe that the union has violated its
duty of "fair representation" by failing to call the witness. Neverthe-
less, for other reasons, he may still decide against calling the witness
himself.
To safeguard the reputation of arbitration, as against readers of
the opinion disturbed at the apparent failure of anyone (party or arbi-
trator) to perceive the absence of crucial testimony, the arbitrator
should explain the reasons for his refusal to call the witness. On the
other hand, he should not mention the relationship between the "miss-
ing witness" problem and a possible fair representation suit. To do so
would invite an even angrier reaction from the union than if the arbi-
trator had simply called the witness at the arbitration. Moreover, given
the sophistication of many employees about their union's duty of fair
representation, it would seem unnecessary to mention this in the opin-
ion. But a full account of the importance of the testimony and of his
unsuccessful attempts to play the educational-facilitating role, might
help resolve any fair representation claim, by providing an objective
and freshly-recorded account of the events surrounding the missing
testimony.
If possible, the arbitrator should raise with the parties his intention
to discuss the missing testimony issue in the opinion. Parties might be
embarrassed by such a discussion, no matter how carefully written;
they should have an opportunity to present their concerns to the arbi-
trator. Moreover, there is always the possibility that a stated intention
to discuss the issue in the opinion will finally persuade a recalcitrant
party to call the witness.
X
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The missing witness creates a serious and complex dilemma for the
labor arbitrator. As a practical matter it forces him to confront the
question of his relationship to the parties before him as well as the
question of the propriety of his calling the witness. There is no quick
and easy answer to this dilemma. We have examined three possible
simple solutions-to ignore the problem and rely on acceptability to
the parties, to follow the law, and to do as judges do-and found them
all wanting.
It is perhaps not surprising that no simple solution is apparent, for
the problem involves fundamental questions about the goals of arbitra-
tion and the place of the arbitrator in effectuating these objectives. The
arbitrator's response is necessarily premised-whether explicitly or
not--on some conception of the role an arbitrator does and should play
in the process. Rejecting the case for passivity, we argue for a modestly
[Vol. 5:87
PROBLEM OF MISSING WITNESS
active approach by the arbitrator-what we have called the "educator-
facilitator" role. Through the use of concrete examples designed to il-
lustrate what this role entails in practice, we have attempted to clarify
the parameters of the approach and its implications for the missing wit-
ness situation.
Throughout our analysis we have attempted to account for the
risks which our approach entails. But, we conclude that on the whole
this approach serves the goals of arbitration. It makes for a more in-
formed decision by the arbitrator and makes meaningful the parties'
right to offer proofs and arguments for their positions. We find justifi-
cation for it in terms of party self-interest, the social interest in regulat-
ing employee-employer relationships, and the maintenance of an
effective and creditable dispute-resolution process which achieves just
results.
Ultimately, if the parties do not call the missing witness, the arbi-
trator must confront the option of calling the witness himself. While
we are quite cautious about this option, we do think there are circum-
stances, rare though they may be, in which the arbitrator should call
the witness. While we are unable to offer a hard and fast line, we have
identified and discussed in considerable detail a number of considera-
tions which should be brought to bear on the decision and the direc-
tions in which they point. Our analysis here, we think, should provide
significant guidance to the arbitrator faced with this difficult question.
More broadly, we hope our effort in this article will stimulate thought
about the various problems which confront not only arbitrators, but
judges and other decision-makers as well.
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